You Must Present a Valid Form of (Gender) Identification: The Due Process and First Amendment Implications of Tennessee\u27s Birth Certificate Law by Lowell, Brooke
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 
Volume 28 (2019-2020) 
Issue 4 Article 8 
May 2020 
You Must Present a Valid Form of (Gender) Identification: The Due 
Process and First Amendment Implications of Tennessee's Birth 
Certificate Law 
Brooke Lowell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Fourteenth Amendment 
Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons 
Repository Citation 
Brooke Lowell, You Must Present a Valid Form of (Gender) Identification: The Due Process and 
First Amendment Implications of Tennessee's Birth Certificate Law, 28 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 
1133 (2020), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol28/iss4/8 
Copyright c 2020 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj 
YOU MUST PRESENT A VALID FORM OF
(GENDER) IDENTIFICATION: THE DUE PROCESS AND
FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF TENNESSEE’S
BIRTH CERTIFICATE LAW
Brooke Lowell*
INTRODUCTION
This Note analyzes Tennessee’s prohibition against transgender people changing
their gender markers on their birth certificates under both Fourteenth Amendment Sub-
stantive Due Process and the First Amendment. Part I discusses the relevant terms
related to transgender rights, the importance of birth certificates, and the relevant laws
at play.1 Part II focuses on the Substantive Due Process argument. It lays out the foun-
dational cases and then applies them to analyze whether gender identity is a funda-
mental right.2 Part III explores the First Amendment analysis, focusing on gender
as speech.3 It also discusses how government speech affects the analysis. The Note
concludes by discussing the merits of both the Substantive Due Process and First
Amendment arguments.
I. TERMINOLOGY AND BACKGROUND
A. Transgender Rights
“Transgender” is a term that describes people whose gender identity is different
from the gender they were assigned at birth.4 “Gender identity” is a person’s internal
or personal sense of their own gender and “gender expression” is how a person presents
their gender.5 “Gender dysphoria” is the medical diagnosis of people who experi-
ence emotional distress because their birth sex does not match their gender identity.6
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1 See discussion infra Part I.
2 See discussion infra Part II.
3 See discussion infra Part III.
4 Understanding Transgender People: The Basics, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL.
(July 9, 2016), https://transequality.org/issues/resources/understanding-transgender-people
-the-basics [https://perma.cc/68UL-62Y4].
5 Id.
6 Frequently Asked Questions About Transgender People, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER
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Not all transgender individuals experience dysphoria.7 Transgender individuals en-
counter a plethora of discrimination ranging from employment, housing, voting, im-
migration, travel, and police/prisons.8 A large amount of this discrimination emerges
from transgender individuals’ appearances not aligning with a strict gender binary
that is pushed on society. Transgender individuals often do not adhere to this binary
and may switch between “feminine” and “masculine” dress.9 In reality, gender exists
on a spectrum.10
Because transgender individuals were born with sex organs that do not match
how they identify, their state documents do not usually match their gender expression
or identity.11 This Note does not attempt to also address non-binary individuals, who
do not identify within the strict gender binary at all because that would require a
new gender marker.12 Due to the fact that their gender marker on their identification
may not match how they outwardly identify, transgender people usually have to
endure the process of changing their gender markers on state documents. This Note
focuses on the gender marker amendment process for birth certificates in Tennessee.
B. The Importance of Birth Certificates
In order to understand how the amendment process adversely affects the trans-
gender community, it is important to recognize how vital birth certificates are to
day-to-day life. This Section highlights a few out of the countless ways mismatched
gender markers affect transgender individuals’ lives.
A person’s birth certificate is used “in determining eligibility for employment,
obtaining other documents (e.g., driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, passports,
and other state identification documents), establishing school records, proving age,
and enrolling in government programs.”13 Due to the variety of situations in which
EQUAL. (July 9, 2016), https://transequality.org/issues/resources/frequently-asked-questions
-about-transgender-people [https://perma.cc/C3JR-YLL5] [hereinafter FAQs].
7 Id.
8 Issues, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://transequality.org/issues [https://
perma.cc/D66H-6UQY] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
9 Katherine J. Wu, Between the (Gender) Lines: The Science of Transgender Identity,
SCI. IN THE NEWS (Oct. 25, 2016), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2016/gender-lines-sci
ence-transgender-identity/ [https://perma.cc/3W9H-9GJ4].
10 Ravishly, Neuroscience Proves What We’ve Known All Along: Gender Exists on a Spec-
trum, HUFFPOST (Mar. 22, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ravishly/neuroscience
-proves-what-_b_6494820.html [https://perma.cc/3P5H-HTXB]; see Wu, supra note 9 (“Like
many other facets of identity, it can operate on a broad range of levels and operate outside
of many definitions.”).
11 FAQs, supra note 6.
12 Andy Newman, Male, Female or ‘X’: The Push for a Third Choice on Official Forms,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2N2aZFz.
13 Lisa A. Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure
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a birth certificate is needed, having an inaccurate one has serious implications.14 A
birth certificate may be a factor considered in whether or not an individual’s gender
identity is recognized.15 Furthermore, having a birth certificate that does not match
one’s identity can “out” the person as transgender.16 This can lead to discrimination
and violence, especially in sex-segregated facilities such as bathrooms.17
This can also lead to discrimination in practical situations, such as a transgender
individual trying to find employment.18 During the hiring process, an employer may
notice that the applicant’s identity and gender marker do not match and subse-
quently discriminate against that applicant.19 Employees in the United States are
required to fill out an I-9 form before beginning employment.20 If an employee does
not have a passport or Social Security card, that person is required to show their
birth certificate instead.21 But even if one does have access to their Social Security
card, it is given in conjunction with an identification card with a gender marker that
stems from one’s birth certificate.22
Transgender individuals also encounter discrimination and hardship whenever
they need to have their ID checked.23 Again, the gender marker on one’s ID card stems
from the birth certificate,24 meaning that if the gender on the birth certificate does
not match, all subsequent identification does not match.25 According to the 2015
U.S. Transgender Survey, “25% of people were verbally harassed, 16% were denied
services or benefits, 9% were asked to leave a location or establishment, and 2%
were assaulted or attacked” when their gender marker did not match the gender they
were presenting.26 Inaccurate gender markers can also discourage travel out of fear
of discrimination while going through airport security.27 The National Center for
Accurate Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recog-
nizing the Lives of Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 391 (2013).
14 See id.
15 Id. at 392.
16 See id.
17 See id.; Timothy Zick, Restroom Use, Civil Rights, and Free Speech “Opportunism,”
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 963, 966 (2017).
18 Mottet, supra note 13, at 392.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 393.
21 Proof of U.S. Citizenship and Identification When Applying for a Job, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/proof-us-citizenship-and-identifica
tion-when-applying-job [https://perma.cc/FJ4W-RFW8] (last updated July 10, 2018).
22 Mottet, supra note 13, at 392, 394.
23 See id. at 395.
24 Id. at 392 (“Birth certificates establish the initial gender designation for other govern-
mental identity documents, such as driver’s licenses, passports and Social Security records.”).
25 See id.
26 S. E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015
U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 82 (2016).
27 Id. at 212–13.
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Transgender Equality explains that “[t]he gender information included in [one’s]
reservation is used to eliminate false matches with the same or similar names—not
to evaluate a person’s gender,” but this does not stop Transportation Security Ad-
ministration (TSA) agents from discriminating.28 There are documented instances
of agents questioning one’s marker.29 In fact, in 2016, the TSA enacted a policy that
codified discrimination against transgender individuals.30 The rule implemented
body-scan technology that requires agents to select either a pink or blue button
based on how an individual presents themselves.31 “The machine’s software scans
male and female bodies differently and will trigger an alert over any anomaly.”32 An
anomaly would be, for example, a transgender woman who still has male genitalia.33
This results in pat-downs and inspections of one’s genital area.34 Additionally, TSA
policy dictates that an individual be patted down by an agent that is the same gender
as them, ignoring the fact someone may not be comfortable being patted down by
someone that is the same gender they present, as they likely still have the opposite
sex’s genitalia.35
One’s right to vote is also infringed. The Williams Institute at the UCLA School
of Law found that transgender individuals in eight states in particular may be
stopped from voting.36 Poll workers may turn away individuals if their identification
does not match how they present themselves.37
28 Know Your Rights: Airport Security, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://
transequality.org/know-your-rights/airport-security [https://perma.cc/WN3J-4GSD] (last
visited Apr. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Airport Security].
29 See Katelyn Burns, Traveling While Trans: Airport Security Sees Your Genitals as Cause
for Alarm, REWIRE.NEWS (May 5, 2017, 9:59 AM), https://rewire.news/article/2017/05/05
/traveling-trans-airport-security-sees-genitals-cause-alarm/ [https://perma.cc/F8SU-SDPP].
30 See New TSA Policy Codifies Discrimination Against Transgender People, NAT’L LGBTQ
TASK FORCE (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.thetaskforce.org/new-tsa-policy-codifies-discrimina
tion-against-transgender-people/ [https://perma.cc/XWV4-63SL] [hereinafter New TSA Policy].
31 Id.
32 Fredrick Kunkle, Transgender Passengers Uneasy About TSA Shift on Pat-Downs, WASH.
POST (Mar. 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tripping/wp/2017
/03/25/transgender-passengers-uneasy-about-tsa-shift-on-pat-downs/?noredirect=on&utm
_term=.c60494b7daab [https://perma.cc/2YRE-TFAV].
33 See id. Hailey Melville, 25, a transgender student at Northwestern University’s graduate
school of journalism “has asked the security officers [at the airport] to set the machine to the
male setting and been refused because of her appearance. But when the machine operates on
the female setting, it sets off an alarm that requires her to submit to a pat-down.” Id.
34 New TSA Policy, supra note 30.
35 Airport Security, supra note 28.
36 JODY L. HERMAN & TAYLOR N.T. BROWN, THE WILLIAMS INST., THE POTENTIAL IM-
PACT OF VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS ON TRANSGENDER VOTERS IN THE 2018 GENERAL
ELECTION 1 (2018), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Voter-ID-Laws
-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5AM-4WJR] (identifying Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin as the eight states in question).
37 Id. at 3.
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Other areas impacted by birth certificates are marriage recognition,38 health
insurance,39 and discrimination in sex-segregated facilities.40 It is particularly troubling
in small communities. For example, if a transgender individual buys alcohol at a local
convenience store and their ID does not match their gender because they were
unable to change their birth certificate, the person checking the ID can easily inform
the community.41
C. Tennessee’s Birth Certificate Law
Two states currently prohibit transgender individuals from changing their gender
markers on their birth certificates—Tennessee and Ohio.42 Tennessee’s law is the
most explicit and targeted: “The sex of an individual will not be changed on the
original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”43 While the majority
of the laws in the country allows a gender marker change only if you have shown
proof of transitional surgery, Tennessee goes a step further and outright refuses to
allow the change regardless.44 While this Note focuses on Tennessee because of its
explicit statutory provision, looking at the state of the law in Ohio also provides in-
sight into the gender marker restriction.
Ohio is less targeted. It simply does not provide any guidance on updating
gender markers.45 The fact that there is no statutory scheme whatsoever means the
Ohio Department of Health has the discretion to refuse to change gender markers,
even when presented with a court order for gender change.46 The complaint in the
38 Mottet, supra note 13, at 396.
39 Id. at 397.
40 Id. at 398.
41 See id. at 395 (providing the example of police or security officers sharing information
with a small community).
42 See ID Documents Center—Ohio, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://
transequality.org/documents/state/ohio [https://perma.cc/ASY3-D2K8] (last updated Nov.
2019) [hereinafter Ohio]. Kansas was included on this list until June 2019. See Dion Lefler &
Jonathan Shorman, Kansas to Allow Transgender People to Change Their Gender on Birth
Certificates, WICHITA EAGLE (June 24, 2019, 2:17 PM), https://www.kansas.com/news/poli
tics-government/article231903843.html [https://perma.cc/3WHM-MC2J]; ID Documents
Center—Kansas, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://transequality.org/docu
ments/state/kansas [https://perma.cc/F98P-2UQG] (last updated Nov. 2019).
43 TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2010).
44 Cf. id.; see also K. B., Never Quite the Woman that She Wanted to Be: How State Poli-
cies Transform Gender Marker Identification Into a Scarlet Letter, 15 DUKEMINIER AWARDS
J. 1, 6 (2016) (“Thirty-one of these states specifically require reassignment surgery as a
prerequisite to amending birth certificates.”).
45 Ohio, supra note 42.
46 Id. The ACLU has recently filed suit against Ohio. Complaint at 1–2, Ray v. Himes,
No. 2:18-cv-00272-MHW-CMV (S.D. Ohio 2018).
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ACLU’s recent case against Ohio states the policy as follows: “While the state
provides most people born in Ohio with accurate birth certificates—matching their
gender identity—the state bars transgender people alone from obtaining accurate
birth certificates matching their gender identity. . . . [T]his policy denies transgender
people access to birth certificates they can use.”47
These archaic laws open transgender people to discrimination, harassment, and
violence.48 In the past few years, however, states and territories have been changing
their tune. Puerto Rico, for example, changed its gender marker law after a successful
lawsuit.49 Other states that progressed in the past two years are California, Montana,
New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington.50
D. The Story of Kayla Gore
Rather than looking at this issue in the abstract, it is important to see how it ac-
tually affects transgender individuals. For example, Kayla Gore is an African-American
female who lives in Memphis.51 She is one of the plaintiffs in Lambda Legal’s lawsuit
that challenges Tennessee’s birth certificate law.52 Her birth certificate inaccurately
indicates that her gender is male.53 Gore stated: “[T]he state of Tennessee refuses to
recognize my identity and forces me to carry incorrect identity documents. Tennes-
see’s discriminatory policy complicates every aspect of transgender people’s lives.”54
She believes she is put in harm’s way by this policy, especially as a trans woman of
color.55 Gore has been able to change her gender marker on all other forms of identifi-
cation.56 Her birth certificate alone is what is putting her at risk of being outed or
worse, physically harmed.57 In short, Kayla Gore is negatively impacted by this an-
tiquated law.
47 Complaint, supra note 46, at 2.
48 E.g., id.
49 See Gonzalez v. Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327, 335 (D.P.R. 2018).
50 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103426 (Deering 2019); MONT. ADMIN R.
37.8.311 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.12 (2019); OR. ADMIN R. 333-011-0272 (2018);
WASH. ADMIN CODE § 246-490-075 (2018).
51 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Gore v. Lee, No. 3:19-cv-00328
(M.D. Tenn. 2019).
52 Id. at 1–2.
53 Id. at 5.
54 Lambda Legal Sues Tennessee Over Anti-Transgender Birth Certificate Policy, LAMBDA
LEGAL (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.lambdalegal.org/news/tn_20190423_lambda-legal-sues
-tennessee-birth-certificate-policy [https://perma.cc/B8UT-9XXY].
55 Id.
56 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 51, at 19.
57 Id.
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II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. The Substantive Due Process Framework
Washington v. Glucksberg solidifies the fundamental rights test for analyzing
Substantive Due Process claims.58 First, fundamental rights are those that are “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”59 This means that the right asserted
must be rooted in tradition and implicit in the concept of “ordered liberty.”60 The
second factor that the Supreme Court established is a “careful description” of the
asserted fundamental right.61 There have been successful cases that categorize the
asserted right both narrowly62 or broadly.63
If the asserted right is found to be fundamental, strict scrutiny applies.64 Strict
scrutiny asks the following question: Is the law necessary for achieving a compelling
government purpose?65 If the right is not fundamental, meaning its characterization
is not deeply rooted in history nor implicit in concepts of ordered liberty, the rational
basis standard is applied.66 For rational basis review, the law merely needs to be
“reasonably rationally related” to achieving a legitimate government purpose.67
Applying this framework, the Court held in Glucksberg that aiding a suicide is
not a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause.68 A right to assisted suicide
was found not deeply rooted in history.69 On the contrary, the criminalization and
prohibitions of the act were deeply rooted.70 While this could have been character-
ized as a personal autonomy right, the Court found “[t]hat many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal
58 See 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
59 Id. at 702, 721 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 496, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion)).
60 Id. at 721.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 702; see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (characterizing the
right as “adulterous natural father[s]”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (charac-
terizing the right as “homosexual sodomy”).
63 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (characterizing the right as “intimate
sexual conduct”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (characterizing the right as
“freedom to marry”).
64 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4.
65 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (indicating that the infringement must be “narrowly tail-
ored to serve a compelling state interest” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))).
66 See id. at 735.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 716.
70 Id.
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decisions are so protected.”71 Because this right was not found to be deeply rooted
in tradition or implicit in ordered liberty, it was not fundamental and was only sub-
ject to rational basis.72 This is a low standard and, as such, the state’s assisted suicide
ban was at least reasonably related to the promotion and protection of a number of
Washington’s important and legitimate interests.73 Another important takeaway from
Glucksberg is the Court’s hesitancy to expand the concept of Substantive Due Process
because it is an “unchartered area.”74 The following cases explore privacy rights and
how the Court has discussed further notions of personal liberty and autonomy.
1. Contraception and Abortion
The Supreme Court first explored fundamental non-economic rights by examin-
ing “privacy rights.”75 The Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right to
privacy through the penumbras and emanations of the Constitution,76 i.e., a right to
privacy can be implied from the other rights given by the Constitution.77 In Griswold
v. Connecticut, the Court held that a fundamental right to privacy existed in women
using contraception.78 In part, the Court came to this holding due to its decision in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, where the Court struck down compulsory sterilization because
of its effects on marriage and procreation.79 In Griswold, the main focuses of the
Court were on the autonomy to make one’s own decisions and bodily integrity.80
This is a theme that will continue through the background of other privacy cases.
The fundamental right to privacy over one’s own body continued in Roe v.
Wade.81 In its holding, the Court relied on precedent,82 the right of abortion’s simi-
larity to children, marriage, and bodily integrity,83 and tradition.84 Roe is a prime
71 Id. at 727.
72 Id. at 728 (“That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted ‘right’
to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause. The Constitution also requires, however, that Washington’s assisted-suicide
ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests.”).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 720.
75 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“Various guarantees create zones
of privacy.”).
76 Id. at 484 (describing the penumbras as the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments).
77 Id.
78 See id. at 485–86.
79 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
80 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85 (describing the right to privacy).
81 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
82 See id. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring).
83 See id. at 152–53 (majority opinion).
84 See id. at 129.
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example of how differently rights can be framed. On one hand, the Court found
there was tradition because of Roman and Greek laws.85 On the other hand, at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment, abortion was outlawed.86 Framing it as a right
to privacy or right to personhood makes it easier to find support than if it were framed
as recognizing the right to abortion.87
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court en-
gaged more heavily with the language of bodily integrity and personal autonomy.88
The Court, in upholding the right to abortion, stated that the private realm of family
life “involv[ed] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, [which] are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”89 The Court also created the undue
burden standard, where the purpose or effect of a law may not place a substantial
obstacle in the path of someone seeking pre-viability freedom.90
2. Family and Intimate Relationships
Loving v. Virginia struck down a state law banning interracial marriage.91 This
case was argued under both the Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Clauses,
which would eventually become an important standard.92 The right there was framed
broadly as a right to (heterosexual) marriage, not just a right to interracial marriage.93
When the right was framed this way, marriage is “deeply rooted” in tradition and
“implicit” in “concept[s] of ordered liberty.”94
Michael H exemplifies the difference between framing a right narrowly and
broadly.95 As Kenji Yoshino describes it, “[T]he Justices had a battle royale over how
85 Id. at 130.
86 Id. at 139–40.
87 See Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 147, 158 (2015) (describing this in the context of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
88 See 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
89 Id. at 851.
90 See id. at 874.
91 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967).
92 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (“The Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and
rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-
extensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”).
93 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
94 See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
95 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127–28 n.6 (1989) (“Why should the relevant
category not be even more general—perhaps ‘family relationships’; or ‘personal relationships’;
or even ‘emotional attachments in general’? Though the dissent has no basis for the level of
generality it would select, we do: We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tra-
dition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”).
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abstractly an alleged liberty interest could be defined.”96 This case concerned a
woman who was married to a man, Gerald, and conceived a child with a different man,
Michael.97 While the child was biologically Michael’s, the woman wanted her current
husband to act as the child’s father.98 Michael thereafter argued that he had a Sub-
stantive Due Process right to act as the child’s natural father.99 A plurality of the Court
held against Michael H. and framed the right as “the rights of the natural father
adulterously conceived”100 at the most specific level, instead of a right relating to
“emotional attachments in general.”101 The arguments against Justice Scalia’s frame-
work stem from the idea it would be unlikely that any tradition would exist at this
level of specificity.102
As a background of Lawrence v. Texas, it is essential to see how the intimacy
right was defined before it overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.103 Bowers and Lawrence
both tackled the right of homosexual sodomy.104 The Court in Bowers framed the
right as just that: a right to homosexual sodomy, which of course was not deeply
rooted in tradition.105 When overruling this case, the Lawrence majority fought
against that characterization of the right and went as far as to say “that statement, we
now conclude, discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake.”106 The Court in Lawrence instead framed the right more broadly as
the right to engage in “the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the
most private of places, the home.”107 This right, like the others relating to intimacy,
can also be seen as supporting an even broader right to bodily integrity and auton-
omy.108 While analyzing tradition, the Court did something new—showing evidence
of support by looking at emerging global views.109 Moreover, the majority found
that laws against sodomy were general and did not target the gay population until
the 1970s.110 Interestingly, the State’s main interest in this case was morals.111 While
96 Yoshino, supra note 87, at 154.
97 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113–14.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 113.
100 Id. at 127–28 n.6.
101 Id.
102 Yoshino, supra note 87, at 156.
103 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
104 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
105 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (“It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy.”).
106 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
107 Id.
108 See id. at 562 (“Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”).
109 Id. at 573.
110 Id. at 570.
111 See id. at 571.
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the Court did not state a standard of review, it did find that morals are not legitimate
interests even under rational basis review.112 Justice Scalia, in his dissent, on the
other hand, believed that interests should be able to be based on morality.113
3. Gay Rights and Obergefell
The most relevant Substantive Due Process case in recent history is Obergefell
v. Hodges.114 In this seminal case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of gay marriage.115
This case is important not just for its broad discussion of liberty interests, but also
in that the majority moves away from the traditional history test.116
Similar to Lawrence, Justice Kennedy focused on notions of individual auton-
omy.117 Comparing the case to Lawrence, he stated that “the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”118 Yoshino,
writing about Obergefell, likewise observed that marriage and intimacy as funda-
mental rights are “exemplary rather than exhaustive.”119 Moreover, Kennedy took
Lawrence and the rights of same-sex couples and extended them further when he
wrote: “But while Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individ-
uals to engage in intimate association without criminal liability, it does not follow
that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not
achieve the full promise of liberty.”120 This broad notion of liberty can be imagined
to extend to LGBTQ+ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (or Ques-
tioning), Plus) rights in general, not just same-sex marriage.
Countering the tradition requirement and again echoing Lawrence, the majority
in Obergefell held: “The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our
own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights . . . did not
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions . . . .”121 As a result
of this discussion, Yoshino speculated that “[w]hile tradition remains important in
this four-part analysis, it plays a much less rigid role than it [did in earlier cases].”122
In addition to loosening the reigns on the role that tradition plays in the analysis, the
Obergefell Court was also, similarly to Lawrence, looking to emerging ideas.123 The
Court noted that it was not until the end of the twentieth century that homosexuality
was no longer thought of as an illness.124 The Court continued for paragraphs about
112 Id. at 583.
113 See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
115 See id.
116 Yoshino, supra note 87, at 164.
117 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 2599 (majority opinion).
119 Yoshino, supra note 87, at 166.
120 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
121 Id. at 2598.
122 Yoshino, supra note 87, at 164.
123 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 2596 (majority opinion).
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how these ideas have changed and acknowledged state laws and court cases that
have been favorable to gay rights.125
All in all, the Obergefell Court discusses liberty rights with much more general-
ity.126 It also departed from the rigid tradition test.127 It is important to note that this
opinion is unique in its “double helix” approach of Substantive Due Process and
Equal Protection because the Court relied on how the two work together.128
B. Applying the Fundamental Rights Test to Gender Identity
1. Identifying and Describing the Right
If a case on transgender gender markers were to come to the Supreme Court,
there are two potential ways it would characterize the right based on precedent.129
The first, if a majority of the Court were perhaps more in favor of the right, would
characterize the right broadly.130 The second, if the majority were more attuned to
Scalia’s framework, would characterize the right narrowly.131
A broad right would likely be defined as the right to identify as one’s preferred
gender, or even more broadly, a right to identity generally. A narrow right would
make it clear there is no deeply rooted history for such a specific issue, i.e. the right
of transgender individuals to change their gender markers on their birth certificates.
Regardless of how the Court frames the right, it will be necessary to see how or if
transgender individuals are deeply rooted in history and tradition.132
2. Is the Right “Fundamental”?
Again, regardless of how the right is characterized, the Court would likely spend
a large amount of time on whether the right is deeply rooted in history and tradition.133
So, how long has the concept of “transgender” been around? Actually, for a very long
time. While the term was not yet coined at this point in history, Native American
125 Id. at 2596–97.
126 See Yoshino, supra note 87, at 166.
127 Id. at 164.
128 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590 (“The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet each may be
instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”).
129 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (defining a broad right to
marry), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (defining a more narrow right
to “intimate sexual conduct”).
130 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
131 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.
132 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568–75 (discussing history and tradition in regards to
homosexual individuals).
133 See, e.g., id.
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tribes prior to the 1800s did not recognize a strict gender binary as we have today.134
In fact, “Native Americans have often held intersex, androgynous people, feminine
males and masculine females in high respect.”135 The term used to describe these
individuals in modern times is “two-spirits,” but in the past, they were referred to
as “berdache.”136 In the twentieth century, however, “two-spirits” were often forced
by European Christians to conform to more traditional gender roles.137 The lesbian
and gay movement in the 1960s allowed for the re-emergence of androgyny within
Native American communities which continued into the 1990s.138
While Native American tribes continued to be an inspiration to movements
advocating for same-sex marriage and challenging gender norms, the American
Colonies stood in stark contrast.139 Those who lived as a different gender in the
seventeenth and eighteen centuries were usually condemned, and those individuals
were even arrested for such behavior.140 One of the first recorded examples of a
transgender individual during the colonial era was Thomas/Thomasine Hall.141 What
happened to Hall in Jamestown is described aptly in Trans Bodies, Trans Selves:
Perhaps because it took Hall at his or her word that he or she
was bigendered (what we would call intersex today), the court
ordered Hall in 1629 to wear both a man’s breeches and a
woman’s apron and cap. In a sense, this unique ruling affirmed
Hall’s dual nature and subverted traditional gender categories.
But by fixing Hall’s gender and denying him or her the freedom
to switch between male and female identities, the decision pun-
ished Hall and reinforced gender boundaries.142
In the nineteenth century, many individuals left the east coast and moved west to gain
greater freedom.143 Others moved to more industrialized cities, where they created
134 See Walter L. Williams, The ‘Two-Spirit’ Peoples of Indigenous North Americans,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2010 7:28 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/music/2010/oct/11/two
-spirit-people-north-america [https://perma.cc/K2PR-BAAY].
135 Id.
136 Id. “Berdache” is defined as: “an American Indian who assumes the dress, social
status, and role of the opposite sex.” Berdache, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/berdache [https://perma.cc/X5QJ-FBME] (last visited
Apr. 14, 2020).
137 Williams, supra note 134; see also Genny Beemyn, US History, in TRANS BODIES,
TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 501–02 (Laura Erickson-
Schroth ed., 2014).
138 Williams, supra note 134.
139 Beemyn, supra note 137, at 503.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 503–04.
142 Id. at 504 (internal citations omitted).
143 See id.
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different gendered living communities.144 This is where “drag” began, with the earliest
known instance taking place in 1885.145 By the 1930s, drag had spread rapidly and
took place in almost every major city at the time.146
Although it is clear that individuals have been identifying opposite their gender
for centuries, when the term “transgender” was recognized is important to the analy-
sis.147 In 1949, Dr. Caudwell was the first to use the term “transsexual” but believed
that those individuals were mentally ill.148 In the 50s and 60s, Dr. Benjamin was one
of the first to distinguish between biological and psychological sex, and used the
terms “transsexual” and “transvestite.”149 Organizing efforts of the transgender com-
munity began in the 1950s and 60s as well, reaching its peak with the Stonewall Riots
in New York City.150 There were many similar riots before Stonewall, many of which
were started by drag queens.151
In recent years, transgender rights have actually been upheld. In the November
2018 elections, Massachusetts passed the first statewide referendum protecting trans-
gender rights.152 This referendum shows that despite animosity toward transgender
individuals, states are willing to pass laws protecting them. Currently, twenty-one
states prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in the
employment context.153 In addition, twenty states address hate crimes based on
gender identity.154
In stark contrast, however, are the laws that still discriminate against LGBTQ+
people in general, including the transgender community.155 Moreover, “‘Transgender’
Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under [the] Trump Administration.”156
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003) (noting that the category “homosex-
ual” didn’t exist in old sodomy laws and that laws didn’t target homosexuals until the 1970s).
148 Beemyn, supra note 137, at 507.
149 Id.
150 See id. at 515.
151 Id.
152 Morgan Gstalter, Massachusetts Passes First Statewide Referendum Protecting Trans-
gender Rights, HILL (Nov. 6, 2018, 10:42 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch
/415402-massachusetts-passes-ballot-measure-preserving-transgender-rights [https://perma
.cc/UYJ2-HWDW].
153 State Maps of Laws and Policies: Employment, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www
.hrc.org/state-maps/employment [https://perma.cc/EX3W-FB8D] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
154 State Maps of Laws and Policies: Hate Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www
.hrc.org/state-maps/hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/P3MF-QVYF] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
155 The Discrimination Administration, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://trans
equality.org/the-discrimination-administration [https://perma.cc/8ADE-EQSF] (last visited
Apr. 14, 2020). See generally ACLU, TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND THE LAW: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (2015) [hereinafter TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND THE LAW].
156 Erica L. Green et al., ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under Trump
Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2R9W1jB.
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Important to the Lawrence analysis is if or when transgender individuals started
being criminalized and prosecuted. Transgender rights can sometimes be swept up
into homosexual rights because one’s identity changing may make them interested
in the same sex. In such a case, it was not until the 1970s that states criminally prose-
cuted same-sex relations.157 Beginning in the 1840s, states did criminalize “cross-
dressing,” but most of these laws have now been overturned.158 On the contrary,
federal and state laws are now in place to protect transgender individuals.159
More importantly is the emergence of new laws.160 As shown in Part I, many
state laws expressly allow transgender individuals to identify how they choose on
their birth certificate.161 There is, so to speak, “an emerging recognition” of transgender
rights.162 While the term “transgender” and its recognition may not be as deeply
rooted as other rights, it can follow under the same analysis as Lawrence, where the
Court focused on emerging views.163
In essence, the argument is a close one. If the Court were to stick to only a very
strict understanding of “deeply rooted in history and tradition,” the right would likely
fail on this factor. However, if the Court analogized to Lawrence and focused on
emerging ideas, it could pass muster.164
Constitutional law scholars, including Geoffrey Stone, believe that “many of the
unenumerated fundamental rights that the Court has recognized clearly involved
new applications of traditionally-recognized rights in light of evolving social under-
standings and values.”165 He offers Skinner v. Oklahoma,166 Griswold v. Connecticut,167
Eisenstadt v. Baird,168 Loving v. Virginia,169 and Roe v. Wade170 as examples.171 The
Court, as Stone sees it, did not focus narrowly on these rights; “it asked whether the
general understanding of the right was ‘deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and
157 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570 (2003).
158 See Arresting Dress: A Timeline of Anti-Cross-Dressing Laws in the United States,
PBS NEWS HOUR (May 31, 2015, 12:36 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/arresting
-dress-timeline-anti-cross-dressing-laws-u-s [https://perma.cc/CLP3-F435].
159 TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND THE LAW, supra note 155, at 2 (noting that Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia all have such laws).
160 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
161 See discussion, supra Section I.B.
162 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
163 Id.
164 See id.
165 GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW FROM
AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 519 (2017).
166 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
167 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
168 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
169 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
170 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
171 See STONE, supra note 165, at 519.
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tradition,’ and then determined whether a particular restriction violated evolving and
contemporary understandings of that . . . right.”172
The next step of determining whether a right is fundamental is whether it is
“implicit in ordered liberty.”173 Implicit in ordered liberty essentially means whether
a well-ordered society could function without the right.174 Here, if individuals never
had identification that matched their gender expression, this would not contribute
to an ordered society. It is easy to imagine a society that doesn’t recognize trans-
gender rights because many people don’t.175
3. Is the Right Supported by Precedent?
The Supreme Court’s lack of opinions on transgender individuals does not stop
this analysis. An individual changing their gender marker is an expression of iden-
tity. Values of personal autonomy and identity are supported by precedent, which
is consistently an important piece of the Supreme Court’s analysis when it comes
to fundamental rights.176 One of the most persuasive precedents here is Lawrence.
The Court there stated: “Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom
of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”177 Casey echoes a
similar stance on identity:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the State.178
The stark difference between the precedent cases and the case at hand is the fact that
gender identity is not always private and in the home. However, the cases on marriage,
which is a public, governmental act, mitigate this dichotomy. Perhaps the way to recon-
cile the rights to autonomy in the private realm with the fact that gender identity is
a public expression is to also focus on the right to marriage. Moreover, how one is
allowed to identify can affect those intimate relationships.
172 Id.
173 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
174 See id.; see also id. at 743 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
175 See ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., AMERICA’S GROWING
SUPPORT FOR TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 7 (2018).
176 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 851 (1992).
177 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
178 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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Lawrence and Casey are analogous to the issue at hand because of their focus
on the right to define one’s own existence,179 and other precedents still support this
idea. For instance, Skinner and Loving, relating to procreation and marriage, recog-
nize a right to choose.180
Lawrence and Casey were the strongest precedent until the Court ruled on
Obergefell in 2015.181 Justice Kennedy’s expansion of the liberty right in that case
looks strong for transgender rights.182 Moreover, Lawrence and Obergefell are helpful
support of the expansion of fundamental rights. Yoshino discusses that these two
cases together represent “antisubordination liberty.”183 This means that going forward,
the Supreme Court will likely analyze “the impact of granting or denying such
liberties to historically subordinated groups.”184 As transgender individuals are clearly
subordinated, the future jurisprudence may look more favorable after Obergefell.
The strongest language in Obergefell that supports the issue at hand is similar to the
broad liberty language in Lawrence: “But while Lawrence confirmed a dimension
of freedom that allows individuals to engage in intimate association without criminal
liability, it does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step
forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”185 The freedom does not
stop at Lawrence or at Obergefell, and this language supports a progressive move-
ment towards more LGBTQ+ rights. In addition, Obergefell also focused on emerg-
ing ideas and stepped away from strictly interpreting tradition.186
There is, however, some language in recent gay rights litigation in the Supreme
Court that cuts against Obergefell being favorable to this argument.187 While always
sympathetic to gay rights, Justice Kennedy never identifies a level of scrutiny for
them in Obergefell.188 Moreover, the analysis has never gone far enough to see if
discrimination against gay individuals invokes a compelling state interest under an
intermediate or strict scrutiny regime.
179 See K. B., supra note 44, at 15.
180 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
181 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2586 (2015).
182 Cf. Yoshino, supra note 87, at 147–48, 174 (“Where Loving emphasized equality over
liberty, Obergefell made liberty the figure and equality the ground.” (footnote omitted)).
183 Id. at 174.
184 Id.
185 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
186 See id. at 2595 (discussing how marriage has evolved over time).
187 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727
(2018) (“Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be
treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”). Despite this language, Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion still ruled against the gay couple. Id.
188 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Yet the majority fails to provide
even a single sentence explaining how the Equal Protection Clause supplies independent weight
for its position, nor does it attempt to justify its gratuitous violation of the canon against un-
necessarily resolving constitutional questions.”).
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Regardless of whether gay rights are deeply rooted, it seems apparent that the
precedence supports an expansion of LGBTQ+ rights. The Supreme Court has in-
creasingly favored personal freedoms and autonomy relating to sexual orientation.189
While gender identity and sexual orientation are not one and the same, they are often
related. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s recognition of gay marriage in Obergefell
v. Hodges also helps to provide support.190
C. Deciding Which Level of Scrutiny to Apply
If the right is deemed to be one that is fundamental, strict scrutiny would apply.191
Tennessee has not stated any specific interests, but governmental interests are pretty
similar across the board. State governments’ alleged interests in rules about gender
markers are generally: “(1) accurate records and government efficiency, (2) pre-
vent[ing] fraud, and (3) national security.”192 Is the law of denying gender marker
changes necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose? While it would be
hard to say that the government’s interests are not compelling, there are some gaps.
In terms of accuracy of documents, the government’s purpose is undercut by the fact
that identification would be more accurate if state records conform to how the
individual identifies.193 The fear of fraud—i.e., that people may pretend to transition—is
no longer relevant. The most common example of fraud was same-sex marriage,
which was legalized by Obergefell.194 Lastly, national security is clearly a compel-
ling interest, although that argument also has flaws.195 These rationales will be
discussed more under the First Amendment analysis.196
Assuming these purposes are compelling, are the laws narrowly tailored? For
the first two interests, the answer is no. A blanket ban on changing gender markers
is too strict, and there are other types of laws that are more closely related. For
instance, some states require reassignment surgery, a note from a therapist or
physician, or a court order before changing a gender marker.197 Therefore, Tennessee
would not pass strict scrutiny.
Even if the right is only subject to rational basis review, there is an argument that
these laws still would not pass muster. The government’s interest remains the same but
189 See, e.g., id. at 2597, 2599.
190 See id. at 2608.
191 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
192 K. B., supra note 44, at 21.
193 Id. at 21–22.
194 See id. at 22.
195 See discussion infra Part III.
196 See discussion infra Part III.
197 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-9A-19, 22-9A-21 (2016) (providing for the amendment of
one’s birth certificate upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent juris-
diction indicating said individual’s sex “has been changed by surgical procedure”); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 13-E (2015) (providing for the amendment of one’s birth record with
a notarized certificate from a physician).
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now only needs to be rationally related to the purpose. While normally this is an easy
standard to meet, there is an argument to be made that the correct analysis is rational
basis with bite (animus).198 However, articles that have argued Tennessee would not
pass rational basis due to animus199 miss the mark. Rational basis with bite only ap-
plies in the context of Equal Protection cases.200 The concurrence in Lawrence
actually developed an Equal Protection argument in addition to a Substantive Due
Process one, ultimately finding animus.201 Because animus is not applicable to
Substantive Due Process, if the right is not fundamental, then rational basis is the
correct standard, and the law likely would pass review. In reality, the Court probably
would not state which level of scrutiny it is applying like when it failed to do in
Lawrence and Obergefell.202
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances.”203 The First Amendment’s application is clear in
many cases. Although speech is most clearly protected, expression of one’s gender
identity may also fall under this protection.
A. Background Cases and Tests
United States v. O’Brien is the seminal case illustrating that even symbolic conduct
can fall under First Amendment protection.204 In that case, O’Brien burned his draft
card in a symbolic opposition to the Vietnam War.205 He was subsequently convicted
under a law that specifically criminalized the destruction of draft cards.206 While the
Supreme Court upheld the law as constitutional, this case provided a framework for
future symbolic speech cases, and the Court at least recognized that symbolic conduct
can be regulated.207
198 See United States Dep’t. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See generally Raphael
Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072 n.4 (2015).
199 See K. B., supra note 44, at 24.
200 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
201 Id. at 579–85.
202 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
203 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
204 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
205 Id. at 369.
206 Id. at 370.
207 See id. at 377.
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The test that O’Brien established is further discussed in Texas v. Johnson.208 The
first part is to determine if the activity is an expressive act under the Spence test.209
To analyze this point, one should ask: (1) is there an intent to convey a particular-
ized message?;210 and (2) is the likelihood great that, in context, the message will be
understood by an audience?211 If both questions are answered in the affirmative, the
O’Brien analysis is then applicable.212 This analysis further dictates that regulations
implicating an expressive act are valid only if: (1) it is within the constitutional power
of government to affect;213 and (2) the government interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free speech, i.e., it is content-neutral.214 If neither or only one are true,
apply strict scrutiny;215 if both are true, apply intermediate scrutiny.216
In Texas v. Johnson, Johnson publicly burned an American flag as a means of po-
litical protest.217 He was then convicted of desecrating a flag in violation of Texas
law.218 In applying Spence, the Court found this was clearly expressive conduct.219 The
Court referred to Johnson’s burning of the flag as “conduct sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication.”220 Because the O’Brien test only applies if the sup-
pression of speech is content-neutral, it did not apply to Johnson’s case.221 The regula-
tion was not incidental to the suppression of free speech because it specifically forbids
the desecration of venerated objects.222 This differs from O’Brien because an individ-
ual could burn the flag in an appropriate way, but not in an insulting way.223 The
state interest of national unity was not a compelling state interest, and, therefore, did
not pass strict scrutiny.224
Finally, Clark v. Community of Creative Non-Violence analyzed a time, place,
and manner restriction.225 The Court found that protestors sleeping in Lafayette Park
208 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
209 Id. at 410 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (holding that the same
interest asserted by Texas here was insufficient to support a criminal conviction under a flag-
misuse statute for the taping of a peace sign to an American flag)).
210 Id. at 404 (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11).
211 Id. (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11).
212 Id. at 407.
213 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
214 Id.
215 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412, 420.
216 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
217 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 406.
220 Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
221 Id. at 407.
222 Id.
223 See id. at 410 (“If he had burned the flag as a means of disposing of it because it was
dirty or torn, he would not have been convicted of flag desecration under this Texas law.”).
224 Id. at 420.
225 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).
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were practicing speech, but that the government bar on overnight sleeping was un-
related to the suppression of that speech.226 Moreover, the Court focused on avail-
able alternative means of communicating their message.227
B. Applying the Symbolic Conduct Framework to Gender Identity
1. Spence Test
The most challenging aspect of this analysis is the argument that gender identity
and expression is an expressive act and therefore eligible to be symbolic conduct
under Spence.228 At first glance, one may think how an individual chooses to identify
is completely unrelated to intentional speech. Jeffrey Kosbie challenges this, and, for
many reasons, argues that gender identity clearly meets the expressive act require-
ment.229 For one, he uses Doe v. Yunits, a case from the Superior Court of Massachu-
setts, which held that a transgender girl’s clothing choice was protected speech and,
as such, that she must be allowed to present herself as a girl,230 to illustrate how
gender identity should be protected as speech.231
Furthermore, Kosbie tackles whether gender identity is communicative under
Spence v. Washington.232 Again, this case can be articulated as describing protected
conduct as “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.”233 Kosbie and
others argue “that the central concern of speech-conduct tests is protecting conduct
when it is communicative.”234 While looking at speech this way, it is essential to key
in on the social context of the communication.235 This social context is what really
turns gender expression and identity into speech.236 Professor Timothy Zick focused
his First Amendment argument on bathroom bills,237 and Kosbie similarly uses the
example of bathroom use to convey his point.238 The following excerpt illustrates
how gender expression applies to using the restroom:
226 Id. at 288, 299.
227 Id. at 288, 293.
228 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
229 Jeffrey Kosbie, (No) State Interests in Regulating Gender: How Suppression of Gender
Nonconformity Violates Freedom of Speech, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187, 187 (2012).
230 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No.001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4, *8 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 11, 2000).
231 See Kosbie, supra note 229, at 202.
232 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Kosbie, supra note 229, at 203–10.
233 Spence, 418 U.S. at 409.
234 Kosbie, supra note 229, at 204. See generally John Greenman, On Communication, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1337 (2008).
235 See Kosbie, supra note 229, at 204.
236 See id. at 205.
237 See Zick, supra note 17, at 963.
238 Kosbie, supra note 229, at 206.
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Everyone communicates a message of gender identity by using
a single-sex restroom. . . . Social norms ascribe gender meaning
to restroom choice. Even if a cisgender woman used the men’s
restroom because the line was shorter, others might think she
was a man or be confused by her restroom choice. Similarly, if
a transgender woman uses the women’s restroom, others will
likely either think she is a woman, or challenge her restroom
choice because they think she appears too masculine. When a
trans woman uses the women’s restroom, she communicates her
femininity even if she passes, and especially if she does: if no
one questions her, then she has successfully communicated that
she is a woman. But even if she is challenged, her restroom
choice communicates a message of gender identity.239
The same can be said for birth certificates. If an individual is allowed to change
their gender marker to reflect their gender identity, they are either successfully com-
municating their gender identity or they will be questioned for not looking how one
perceives males or females should look. When a trans woman changes her gender
marker to female, “she challenges the assumption that femininity only belongs to
cisgender women.”240 Ideas around sex-segregated bathrooms and identification with
gender are deeply rooted in the gender binary.241 We assume that things of this nature
will automatically conform with the gender binary.242 Therefore, when transgender
people make a choice associated with their gender identity, they are communicating
opposition to the gender binary.243
Kosbie illustrates an example that further shows how social context matters. He
writes, “If restrooms are unisex, then restroom choice cannot communicate a gender
message.”244 Similarly, one can imagine this same logic being applied to birth certifi-
cates or even identification in general. If all pieces of identification had gender-
neutral markers, choosing a certain gender would not be communicating a message.
The biggest counter-argument to this interpretation of Spence is the Supreme
Court’s clear two-part test in its decision, particularly that the speaker must intend
to communicate a message.245 Kosbie argues, in the alternative, that the communica-
tion should be protected even if it does not have specific intent.246 Despite the well-
known two-pronged approach, other courts have noted that the explicit test from
Spence actually only requires “activity [that] was sufficiently imbued with elements
239 Id. (internal citations omitted).
240 Id.
241 See id. at 206–07.
242 See id. at 207.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 207–08.
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of communication.”247 To bolster this argument, recent cases have not even cited
Spence when referring to expressive conduct.248 Other scholars similarly argue that
if the conduct is communicative, intent should not matter.249 First Amendment scholar
Professor Greenman uses the example of a nude dancer.250 The nude dancer’s mental
state “does not make the dancing more or less communicative.”251 Therefore, one
may communicate an idea that they do not currently think or feel.252
The bottom line is this: “Whether or not individual transgender people subjec-
tively intend to express a message, the audience easily understands the message”253
because gender in itself is communicative.
Others argue against the second prong of Spence—that the message is not
understood.254 The school district in Doe v. Yunits tried to make this very argument
but the Massachusetts court rejected it, explaining that “[o]ther students did not need
to understand what it meant to be transgender in order to understand the overall
message [of defiance].”255
Timothy Zick adopts much of Kosbie’s argument but expands it, focusing com-
pletely on bathroom bills.256 Zick similarly begins his analysis with Spence.257 Instead
of trying to counter that case, Zick explains that the Court, in several cases, just
assumes coverage.258 He notes “burning a draft card as part of a political protest,
burning the flag in a similar context, and sleeping outdoors as part of a protest of laws
affecting the homeless . . . .” as examples where the Court assumed speech.259 Zick,
like Kosbie, hones in on the particular context of the choice.260 Zick similarly gives
Yunits as an example and then goes on to discuss Kosbie and agrees that “communi-
cation of and respecting gender is deeply embedded in our social norms concerning
masculinity and femininity.”261 Zick ends his argument for this part of his article by
concluding that the speech coverage argument is strong for gender identity.262
247 Id. at 208 (quoting Troster v. Pa. State Dep’t of Corr., 65 F. 3d 1086, 1090 (3d Cir. 1995)).
248 Id. (including Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 49 (2006)).
249 Id.
250 Greenman, supra note 234, at 1343.
251 Kosbie, supra note 229, at 208 (citing Greenman, supra note 234, at 1343).
252 Id.
253 Id. at 209.
254 Id. (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No.001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000)).
255 Id. (citing Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4).
256 See Zick, supra note 17, at 977–79.
257 Id. at 976.
258 Id.
259 Id. (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1984);
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
260 Id. at 977.
261 Id.
262 See id. at 979.
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2. O’Brien Test
After deciding that gender identity is a form of speech and has fulfilled the
Spence test, the next step in the analysis is the O’Brien test.263 The regulation is valid
if it is within the constitutional power of the government and if the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech.264 However, it is essential to
decide whether Tennessee’s law is content-neutral or content-based. If it is content-
based, the analysis is over and strict scrutiny is applied.265 If it is content-neutral, the
regulation has to further a substantial governmental interest.266
Tennessee’s law reads as follows: “The sex of an individual shall not be changed
on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”267 Contrasted with
Ohio’s laws, which provides no guidance on any gender marker changes, Tennessee’s
appears to be a content-based ban.268 The law targets transgender individuals by
specifically disallowing them to change their gender marker even after a sex-change
surgery.269 Moreover, individuals in Tennessee are allowed to change their gender
markers for other reasons.270 If a mistake was made when a child was born, gender
markers can be changed through a notarized affidavit.271 Because the Tennessee
Office of Vital Records allows that change, yet specifically forbids individuals who
have had sex changes from changing their gender markers,272 Tennessee’s law is
content-based, like in Texas v. Johnson.273 The Court held in Johnson that “[t]he
restriction on Johnson’s political expression is content based, since the Texas statute
is not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but
is designed to protect it from intentional and knowing abuse that causes serious
offense to others.”274 Similarly, Tennessee’s law is content-based because it is not
applicable to the changing of gender markers in all circumstances.
While the government could argue that it is content-neutral since it treats everyone
who has reassignment surgery the same, the stronger argument is that gender marker
changes are not protected by the First Amendment because they are not expression.
The government could argue that gender identity does not meet the Spence test of
263 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
264 Id.
265 See id.
266 Id.
267 TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2010).
268 See Ohio, supra note 42.
269 TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d).
270 How Do I Get My Certificate Corrected?, TENN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.tn.gov
/health/health-program-areas/vital-records/corrected-certificate.html [https://perma.cc/NF2C
-A4T3] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398 (1989).
274 Id.
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expressive conduct.275 Despite the possibility that the Court would view gender
identity as uncovered, it is still worthwhile to see if this law could survive a strict
scrutiny analysis.
Strict scrutiny in the free speech context is not easy to overcome. The law must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.276 In Texas v.
Johnson, for instance, the Court held Texas’s law to “the most exacting scrutiny”
precisely because the law was regulating content.277 The Court was not persuaded
by the State’s compelling interest in national unity.278 The Court stated that “[i]f
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the govern-
ment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”279
Governmental interests for gender marker change refusals are often “(1) accurate
records and government efficiency, (2) prevent[ing] fraud, and (3) national security.”280
The fraud interest is not compelling. This concern mainly arose in the context of
same-sex marriage before it was legalized by Obergefell.281 Even before same-sex
marriage was legal, “[t]here [were] no reported cases of same-sex couples made up
of two non-transgender people where one person changes the gender marker on a
driver’s license for the purpose of receiving a marriage license.”282 There is simply no
real evidence of fraud in the context of birth certificates and transgender individuals.283
With regard to national security interests, some states believe that people should not
be able to change their gender markers because they will disguise their gender to com-
mit crimes.284 Yet, transgender advocates have noted, “[T]he last thing a person who
is trying to blend in and escape notice should do is dress in the opposite gender.”285
Moreover, there is evidence that gender marker changes do nothing to compromise
national security interests.286 For example, the State Department doesn’t require indi-
viduals to get surgery to change their gender marker.287 If the federal government was
truly concerned with national security, it would have a law similar to Tennessee’s.
In terms of the accuracy of government records, the concern is that someone will
“switch back.”288 However, this is easily countered by the fact that even if someone did
275 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1974).
276 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 401.
277 Id. at 412.
278 Id. at 413–15.
279 Id. at 414.
280 K. B., supra note 44, at 21, 25; see also discussion supra Section II.C.
281 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
282 Mottet, supra note 13, at 414.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 415.
288 Id. at 416.
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switch back, their birth certificate would still be accurate while they identified as a
different gender.289 The individual could simply change their gender marker again.290
Additionally, it is not as likely as some think that transgender individuals will later
change back. Lisa Mottet explains that “a return to previous gender happens extremely
rarely and is generally a result of discrimination and rejection from family, friends,
and colleagues.”291 If the concern genuinely is accuracy, then letting people change
their gender markers to match their identity actually upholds this interest.
At the very least, national security is likely compelling. Assuming that it is, the
real issue with this law is its tailoring. A law is not narrowly tailored if it isn’t
helping the interests set forth.292 The interests listed above are actually enhanced by
allowing transgender people to change their gender markers.293 When transgender
individuals cannot change their gender markers to the gender they identify as, the
marker on their identification does not match their expression.294 This makes people
think that the identification is fraudulent, when in fact the person was simply not
allowed to change it.295 Therefore, Tennessee’s law is clearly not narrowly tailored,
as it does not solve the problems that are generally associated with changing gender
markers, such as fear of fraud.
The clearest problem with Tennessee’s law is its lack of tailoring. The Court,
however, has allowed the government much deference when it comes to expressive
activity.296 Before the First Amendment analysis is complete, this Note examines
how the doctrine of government speech affects the First Amendment protection.
C. Do Birth Certificates Speak on Behalf of the Government?
The concept of “government speech” is governed by two Supreme Court cases:
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum297 and Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans.298
First, in Summum, the Supreme Court held that allowing placement of permanent
monuments in a public place was a form of government speech.299 The implication
of falling under government speech is that the speech is no longer subject to the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.300 The Court’s holding was essentially that a
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
293 Mottet, supra note 13, at 415.
294 Id.
295 See id.
296 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
297 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
298 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
299 Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.
300 Id. at 469 (“[G]overnment speech is not restricted by the Free Speech Clause.”).
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monument in a public park, even if privately donated, still reflected the city’s view-
points.301 One quote sums up the difficulty in determining whether something is
government speech: “There may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether
a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private
speech . . . .”302
Walker, decided six years later,303 is more applicable to the discussion at hand.
The Court held in that case that specialty licenses plates were government speech
and therefore not private expression protected by the First Amendment.304 The
expression on the license plate that was determined to be government speech was
a plate for the Sons of Confederate Veterans featuring the Confederate flag.305 The
Court decided that license plates are government speech by deriving a three-pronged
test from Summum.306 Clay Calvert articulates the test as follows: “(1) the history of
the program, medium, or venue in or on which messages occur; (2) who a reason-
able observer of the speech would consider is speaking; and (3) who effectively
controls the selection of the messages.”307
Applying this test to the facts of Walker, the majority held that license plates “long
have communicated messages from the States,” and, therefore, the first prong tilted
toward government speech.308 License plates have been used since the early 1900s to
promote tourism and state slogans.309 They often even contain the state’s emblem.310
For the second prong of the test, the Court held this also leaned toward govern-
ment speech because people perceive Texas’s plates as conveying a message on the
state’s behalf.311 The majority continued to speculate that “a person who displays a
message on a Texas license plate likely intends to convey to the public that the State
has endorsed that message.”312 The Court compared license plates to government
IDs, thereby implying that IDs are government speech.313 “[T]he governmental nature
of the plate is clear from their faces,” the majority held, since “[t]he State places the
301 Id. at 470.
302 Id.
303 Walker, 135 S. Ct. 2239.
304 Id. at 2248, 2253.
305 Id. at 2253.
306 Clay Calvert, The Government Speech Doctrine in Walker’s Wake: Early Rifts and
Reverberations on Free Speech, Viewpoint Discrimination, and Offensive Expression, 25
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1239, 1249 (2017).
307 Id. (citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249).
308 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Calvert, supra note 306, at 1249.
312 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. But see Calvert, supra note 306, at 1249 (“[W]ithout refer-
encing any evidence or research to indicate as such, it is a mere guess by the majority about
why people display specialty plates.”).
313 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249.
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name ‘TEXAS’ in large letters at the top of every plate.”314 In addition, the Court gave
weight to the state requiring vehicle owners to display license plates and that they
are issued by the State.315
The Court held the third prong also shows that the state effectively controls
selection of the messages in question.316 Texas has direct control because the Texas
Department of Motor Vehicles “approve[s] every specialty plate design proposal be-
fore the design can appear on a Texas plate.”317 Therefore, all three factors showed
that license plates are government speech.
Applying the factors from Walker to birth certificates, it is initially unclear whether
birth certificates would count as government speech.318 The history of birth certifi-
cates is dissimilar to that of license plates. Birth certificates are not used in the same
way to promote the state and what it has to offer.319 Birth certificates do not have
state slogans or promote the state in any way. While birth certificates display the state
of birth, they mainly contain information about the individual, including full name,
age, sex, race, date and place of birth, parents’ information, and name and address of
the physician.320 Birth certificates are not used to communicate messages from the
states; they are used to communicate information about the individual who was born.
Second, birth certificates are not as clearly identified with the State as license
plates and government IDs.321 While a state requires and issues birth certificates, it
does not require them to be publicly displayed. Birth certificates are not clearly
endorsing messages on behalf of the state. In fact, birth certificates are extremely
neutral looking. Let’s compare a Tennessee license with a Tennessee birth certifi-
cate. The largest font on the license is the word “Tennessee” with its state nickname,
“The Volunteer State” directly below.322 The entire background of the license is
Tennessee landmarks.323 There are even some Tennessee licenses that have the state
314 Id. at 2248–49 (“Consequently, ‘persons who observe’ designs on IDS ‘routinely—and
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the [issuer’s] behalf.’” (alteration
in original)).
315 Id. at 2248.
316 Id. at 2249.
317 Id. (citing TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 217.45(i)(7)–(8), 217.52(b) (2015)).
318 See id. at 2248–49.
319 See id. at 2243, 2248 (noting that license plates include state animals, slogans, emblems,
and specialty designs that promote state events).
320 Completing the Birth Certificate, OKLA. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.ok.gov
/health/Birth_and_Death_Certificates/Birth_and_Death_Registration_(ROVER)/Birth
_Registration_Training/Completing_the_Birth_Certificate.html [https://perma.cc/3RP6-P49X]
(last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
321 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248–49.
322 Dave Boucher, FAQ: How Do I Restore My Driver’s License in Tennessee?, NASHVILLE
TENNESSEAN (July 6, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2018/07
/06/how-do-restore-my-drivers-license-tennessee/761716002/ [https://perma.cc/7JYH-TJJ2]
(last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
323 Id.
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flag in the upper right-hand corner.324 This license clearly conveys that it represents
Tennessee. When looking at a birth certificate, however, it is less apparent. A birth
certificate says “State of Tennessee” on the top but that is the only state feature.325
The rest is just the required information that all birth certificates have.326 The
differences between birth certificates and licenses/license plates are striking, and the
fact that the state issues birth certificates is likely not enough for them to be govern-
ment speech.327 License plates are even more different from birth certificates and are
essentially enlarged versions of governmental IDs without personally identifying
information. When someone sees a birth certificate, they likely consider the holder
to be the one speaking, not the state.328 Aside from the state name on the top, the rest
of the information is identifying the birth certificate holder.
The last prong is also not as strong as it is in the case of license plates. While
birth certificates are issued by the state, the state usually has “sole control” over
license plates.329 The state can reject designs, whereas birth certificates are uniform.330
Birth certificates are not as heavily regulated as license plates or licenses. People
have multiple copies of their birth certificate and it is relatively easy to get a copy.331
However, if you lose your government identification, there is a more difficult process
to go through.332 This is true of license plates as well.333
In sum, while they may seem similar on their face, birth certificates are actually
starkly different from license plates and state-issued identification. Birth certificates
are not used in the same way to promote the state, it does not seem likely that people
view birth certificates as connected to the state, and the state does not control the
324 TN Driver’s Licenses to Be Renewed Every 8 Years, WRCBTV (Apr. 20, 2015, 9:24
AM), http://www.wrcbtv.com/story/28845790/tn-drivers-licenses-to-be-renewed-every-8
-years [https://perma.cc/9GD6-S33C] (providing an image of a Tennessee driver’s license).
325 Birth Records, TENN. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://sos.tn.gov/products/tsla/birth-records
[https://perma.cc/T9FY-QQJH] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (providing an image of a Tennessee
birth certificate).
326 Id.
327 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248
(2015) (“[E]very Texas license plate is issued by the State.”).
328 But see Calvert, supra note 306, at 1249 (citing Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249).
329 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249 (“Texas law provides that the State ‘has sole control over
the design, typeface, [and] color . . . for all license plates.’”).
330 See id. (“Texas asserts, and SCV concedes, that the State has rejected at least a dozen
proposed designs.”).
331 See How Do I Get My Certificate?, TENN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.tn.gov/health
/health-program-areas/vital-records/certificate.html [https://perma.cc/EDP8-AQVF] (last
visited Apr. 14, 2020).
332 See Replacing Lost Licenses, TENN. DEP’T OF SAFETY & HOMELAND SEC., https://www
.tn.gov/safety/driver-services/classd/dlduplicate.html [https://perma.cc/VJ9Y-NEUR] (last
visited Apr. 14, 2020).
333 See How Do I Get a Tennessee License Plate for My Car?, TENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
https://revenue.support.tn.gov/hc/en-us/articles/207560536-How-do-I-get-a-Tennessee-li
cense-plate-for-my-car- [https://perma.cc/V2UQ-9LBJ] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
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message. All birth certificates have the same information. Overall, Tennessee’s birth
certificate law is likely not exempt from the First Amendment under the government
speech doctrine.
If one accepts the argument that gender is expression and therefore protected by
the First Amendment, as many scholars have,334 Tennessee’s content-based law that
targets transgender individuals would not survive strict scrutiny because it is not
narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.335
CONCLUSION
Substantive Due Process and the First Amendment are two of the multiple
arguments that can be made against Tennessee’s law.336 Which would be most suc-
cessful? Despite the rich history of transgender individuals and the rights of personal
autonomy associated with gender identity and expression, the Supreme Court has
yet to decide a case on transgender rights.337 While Lawrence and Obergefell are the
strongest precedent for LGBTQ+ rights, they both leave much to be desired. The
Court has yet to state that LGBTQ+ rights are fundamental or what level of scrutiny
they would be subject to.
The First Amendment argument seems stronger.338 Despite how the Court has
interpreted the Spence test, there are strong arguments that gender expression is in
and of itself speech. The Court’s decision in O’Brien and lower court decisions
support this.339 A person is undeniably expressing an idea when one decides what
to wear, how to style their hair, and which bathroom to use.340 Tennessee’s law then,
restricts gender expression, but only in a way that targets transgender individuals.
If a gender marker was made in error, that can be changed,341 but transgender indi-
viduals cannot change their gender marker even after sex-reassignment surgery.342
334 See, e.g., CARLOS A. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: A
CONTENTIOUS HISTORY 96 (2017) (“To punish LGBT people for self-identifying as such is
to prevent them from participating in a construction of their own identities. This prohibition
implicates the Free Speech Clause . . . .”); Kosbie, supra note 229, at 205–06; Zick, supra
note 17, at 976.
335 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 401 (1989).
336 Equal Protection being another strong argument.
337 The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for a case involving a transgender employee’s
termination in October 2019. See R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S.
Ct. 1599 (2019).
338 See Zick, supra note 17, at 967 (“In recent years, a general concern has arisen that
litigants are invoking the Free Speech Clause strategically in order to win cases they would
likely lose under other rights provisions.”).
339 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 382–86 (1968); Doe ex rel. Doe v.
Yunits, No.001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000).
340 Kosbie, supra note 229, at 205–06.
341 How Do I Get My Certificate Corrected?, supra note 270.
342 TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2010).
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The arguments for strict scrutiny are the same as they are for Substantive Due
Process—not allowing individuals to change their markers is actually counterpro-
ductive to the usual governmental interests. Although the doctrine of government
speech could potentially preclude any arguments about birth certificates, they are
different enough from license plates and state-issued identification.
The transgender community has suffered countless and continued discrimina-
tion. Denial of one’s own gender identity is one of the most extreme examples. The
implications of laws like Tennessee’s are real and severe and affect transgender
individuals’ day-to-day lives.
I think what you’re seeing is a profound recognition on the part
of the American people that gays and lesbians and transgender
persons are our brothers, our sisters, our children, our cousins,
our friends, our co-workers, and that they’ve got to be treated like
every other American. And I think that principle will win out.343
President Obama said this in 2011,344 but despite his view that the principle of trans-
gender recognition will win out, the fight is far from over. One way the transgender
community can be truly recognized is to allow them to change their gender markers
to match how they identify.
343 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Moves Near ‘Greater Equality’ on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES (June 29, 2011), https://nyti.ms/lvSNMG.
344 Id.
